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CROSS EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 
RE: PREVIOUS SEXUAL ACTIVITIES WITH PERSON OTHER THAN 
THE ACCUSED 
REGINA v. MORDEN - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA013082, December 1991. 
On July 1, "the complainant" broke off her relationship with the accused. This relationship had 
lasted approximately 6 months during which the accused visited the complainant at her home and 
had sexual intercourse with her from time 'to time. She broke off with the accused as her sexual 
preference was women. An additional reason was the possessiveness of the accused. He 
seemed to monitor her activities. 
About a month after the relationship ended, the accused entered the home of the complainant and 
had sexual intercourse with her without her consent. He was charged accordingly and convicted 
by a jury of sexual assault. 
When the complainant was cross-examined, defence counsel asked her if it was not a fact that 
she had sexual intercourse with a man, just two nights before the alleged offence occurred. The 
question was disallowed under the provisions of the criminal code that prohibits a complainant 
from being asked about her previous sexual experience with persons other than the accused, 
unless it is a rebuttal of prosecution evidence of such sexual activity. The.trial judge held that 
the Crown had not introduced such evidence and that the question could not be put. 
Since the trial, but before this appeal was heard by the BC Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Canada decided that the criminal code provisions the trial court had applied, were 
unconstitutional ·and consequently without force or effect. 1 
The BC Court of Appeal held that despite the now defunct provisions of the criminal code 
defence counsel would have been entitled to pursue the complainant's alleged sexual encounter 
with a men other than the accused. The Crown brought out the complainant's sexual preference 
for women as a reason for the break-up of the relationship. This leaves the unequivocal 
impression that the complainant would not have consented to sexual intercourse with the 
accused. The defence was entitled to rebut that evidence. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
1 See Regina v. Seaboyer and R. v. Gayme - 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 or Volume 40 page 
41 of this publication. 
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IS THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN 
POLICE AND PROSECUTOR PRIVILEGED? 
REGINA v. GRAY ET AL - Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver CC910548, February 1992. 
Gray and four others were charged with conspiring to commit offences under the Narcotic 
Control Act. In the wake of very favourable rulings for total disclosure of the Crown's case, 
the defence in this case went a step further. · The defence lawyers applied for disclosure of all 
communications between and advice rendered by Crown Counsel to police. The defence claimed 
to need this information to make a full answer and defence in relation to the issues of adequate 
disclosure, entrapment, abuse of the process of the Court and Charter violations. The Crown 
opposed the application by claiming that a solicitor-client privilege exists in respect to such 
advice and communication. 
In this case the investigation of the· five suspects was unique. The five were strongly believed 
to be major drug traffickers and the operation to capture them was in essence a reverse sting 
operation. Instead of undercover personnel purchasing drugs from them, police offered for sale 
a large quantity of drugs. Usually the investigators are the consumer-purchasers; this time 
police were the wholesalers. The accused agreed to purchase 550 pounds of Hashish for 
$750,000. One pound was given to them prior to a meeting where the deal would be finalized. 
Upon arrival the accused were arrested and the three quarters of a million dollars was seized. 
Needless to say the latter was the adyantage of the reverse sting method. 
Police were the traffickers as they had to supply drugs up front before a deal could be made. 
Needless to say they needed some legal advice as well as policy support to conduct an 
investigation with a strategy like this. 
Crown Counsel had declined to become involved. After a briefing of what was intended, police 
were advised to work this out with their force. The pound of Hashish was not to be given until 
agreement was obtained from the Ministry of Justice. As the plan would cause the officers to 
violate the Narcotics Control Act, members were to be granted immunity before this could be 
carried out. 
The police did receive advice from members (presumably lawyers) of the Justice Ministry. It 
was this advice the defence claimed had to be part of the Crown's disclosure. Without it the 
accused were deprived of making a full answer and defence to the charges against them. 
The definition of the lawyer-client privilege is: 
"Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional 
legal advisor in his capacity as such, the communications relating 
to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at this 
instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by 
his legal advisor except the protection be waived." 
As the definition clearly indicates the privilege is that of the client. 
The cases on this point are interesting. 
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The Alberta Court of Appeal held in 19792 when dealing with a claimed inadequate disclosure 
on the part of the Crown: 
"There is, however, a very considerable distinction between 
furnishing facts and particulars, on the one hand, and placing an 
accused in a direct line of communication between Crown Counsel 
and the investigators, on the other hand" ...... . 
........ "I'm further of the view that the report [to Crown Counsel] 
goes forward in the full expectation of confidentiality. In my view 
such solicitor-and-client relationship must. ... be fostered and 
maintained." 
The Supreme Court of BC decided on a case in 19823 where defence counsel sought to call the 
prosecutor as a witness due to a conversation between him and a police officer that was 
overheard. The Court held that a police officer is not an agent of . the Attorney-General 
(prosecutor). It also decided that the suggestion that a solicitor and client relationship exists 
between a police officer and Crown Counsel is untenable and unsupported by law. 
Though interesting on the point of privilege the Court found that the cases were not directly on 
the point. Also that many cases have been decided since 1982 that have given us a clearer 
picture of the meaning and application of s. 7 of the Charter which includes a right to make a 
full answer and defence to any criminal accusation. 
The Court did actually not say that no ·solicitor-client privilege exists between a police officer 
and Crown Counsel but examined situations where this privilege must yield for the sake of 
justice. The Court had however, no doubt that police officers who seek advice from Crown 
Counsel have and do so, with an expectation ofconfidentiality "which is a corner stone of the 
criminal law". 
2 Medicine Hat Greenhouses and German v. The Queen - 45 C.C.C. 297. 
3 Regina v. Girouard and The Queen - [1982] 68 C.C.C. (2d) 261. 
\ 
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The right to confidentiality or solicitor-client privilege is a substantive rule of law. However, 
there are exceptions to the rule. In other words, the rule is not absolute. Where, for instance, 
the communications with the solicitor are criminal in themselves or intended for a criminal act 
to be committed with, for example, the least chance of detection or conviction, the rule is of no 
force. 
Another exception, particularly in civil proceedings, is where one of the parties claims to have 
acted on what he/she believed was professional legal advice. Then the knowledge of the law 
becomes relevant to the proceedings and the privilege is removed. 
In criminal law the privilege must be removed where the communication with a lawyer may 
assist the accused to prove his innocence. If this was not so the privilege designed to be a 
shield, could become a sword in that it would permit to screen information from a jury that may 
enabled someone to establish innocence. Consequently, where the privilege blocks a person 
from adducing evidence that may assist him in his/her defence, it must yield to the rights 
established in s. 7 of our Charter. If not, the rule would in effect, violate the supreme law. 
The BC Supreme Court viewed the accused's application for disclosure as an application for 
further particulars so a full answer and defence can be made. Said the Court: 
"It is for these reasons that the application [by the accused] is 
allowed and the Crown's right to solicitor-client privilege is 
removed." (emphasis is mine) 
The Court clearly indicated that this does not mean that all and everything had to be disclosed. 
Only those things that are relevant to the defence would be admissible. What ought to be 
disclosed, 
Comment: 
" .... are the general advice which the police received from the 
Crown and matters such as immunity to prosecution and all those 
matters which were dealt with by counsel". 
What is regrettable is that this judgment did not include the relationship between police and 
Crown Counsel. As a matter of fact, it seems that the defence is more interested in the advice 
rendered to the RCMP by Justice Department lawyers, rather than specific advice given to the 
investigators. The former may be a matter of forming force policy while .the latter may be 
advice of a different category all together. As a matter of fact, Crown Counsel, in our 
structure, is not a legal advisor to police. The prosecutor (an agent of the Attorney General) 
belongs to the executive branch of government and is in criminal proceedings "the State". The 
5 
police are neither; they are surrogate citizens robed with discretionary powers and authority that 
are original to the office they hold (free agents). Although they do join the State in its interest, 
they are not "the State". 
Public perceptions; the language used by our judiciary; behaviour of police; the relationship 
between State entities and police, indicate an erosion of the system as it was intended. There 
simply is, particularly since our Charter came into effect in 1982, a wave of Americanization 
of our system. Due to provisions in our Charter similar to those in the US Constitution's Bill 
of Rights, US jurisprudence is quoted without additional comments or editing to reiterate and 
make clear our distinction from the US system. · 
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WATER SKIING OFFENCE FOR OPERATOR OF BOAT. 
MUST OPERATOR BE ON BOARD OF THE TOWING VESSEL? 
REGINA v. GATT - BC Supreme Court, Penticton #18480, April 1992. 
The Criminal Code creates an offence for operating a vessel that is towing a water skier without 
having a responsible person on board to keep watch over the skier. 
The accused operated a remote towing device. It consists of a 6 foot long boat-type device that 
is powered by a 40 h.p. inboard motor and weighs in total about 250 pounds. The device is not 
designed to and cannot carry any person. It is remotely controlled from the handgrip the skier 
holds. He can steer, control the speed and stop the towing device. Should the skier spill and 
lose his/her grip on the handle, the device will automatically stop. 
The accused was operating this "Ski-Free" device and was charged with operating the vessel 
without a responsible person keeping watch. In this case, of course, the accused was the skier 
as well as the operator of the vessel. It is quite obvious that the invitation extended to the police 
to watch the performance, was done by a commercial enterprise to test the law. 
The accused submitted that the device is not a vessel. The trial judge disagreed and convicted 
the accused. He appealed the conviction to the BC Supreme court. Also this Court had no 
hesitation to find that the Ski-Free device is a vessel. It is powered, navigable and meets the 
requirements of the Criminal Code provision mentioned above. 
However, the Supreme Court questioned whether the accused was included in "Every 
one ...... while operating the vessel" etc. The trial judge had held that whether that person is 
on board or not is of no consequence in respect to the offence. The Supreme Court Justice was 
not so sure if that was an accurate finding. He referred to the suggested forms of charges in the 
back of the Martin's Criminal Code. It suggests for an information the wording, "A person who 
operates a vessel while towing another person ..... etc." That seems to indicate that the vessel 
operator and the skier are not one and the same person. He held that Parliament envisioned the 
conventional means of towing a water skier and not the technologically advanced Ski-Free 
device. The Court simply found that the wording of the section was not broad enough to cover 
this situation. Furthermore the section states that the operator must have another person on 
board to watch the skier. This implies that both the operator and the watch person must be on 
board. 
Considering all these issues, the section is ambiguous whether or not the accused was a person 
the section renders criminally liable. The ambiguity had to be resolved in favour of the accused. 
Appeal was granted 
Accused was acquitted 
ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENT OF CLAIM TO I.C.B.C. 
AND TAPES OF SURVEILLANCE TO SHOW THE CLAIM 
AMOUNTED TO AN ATTEMPT TO DEFRAUD 
REGINA v. ERSHAD - Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver CC901508, December 1990. 
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The accused was involved in a car accident and claimed injuries that totally disabled him. He 
is a self employed home contractor and sought compensation for loss of income in addition to 
the usual claims associated with injuries. He told the adjuster that he was unable to walk 
without the assistance of a cane. 
A private investigator was engaged by ICBC and the accused was videotaped and photographed 
laying drain .tiles, hammering, bending and sawing. He, without a limp or use of a cane, was 
seen running to a truck parked nearby the construction site. He'd leave home for work early 
in the morning, go home to change and pick up his cane to keep appointments with his 
physiotherapist. Special investigators of ICBC, to corroborate the evidence of the private 
investigators, attended the construction site and observed the accused, apparently unobstructed 
by any disability, doing all the work of a carpenter and construction worker. Subsequent to this 
ICBC asked the accused to submit a detailed statement of his income loss. He complied and 
delivered a notarized statement of these losses. Obviously the claim was inconsistent with what 
was observed. He was charged with attempted fraud as a result. During his trial . the 
admissibility of the video tapes and his statement were argued in the Supreme Court of BC. 
In regard to the statement the defence claimed that the right to remain silent should extend into 
the investigatory stages of a civil insurance claim process. ICBC asked the accused for the 
statement which was the basis for this criminal allegation. He had the right to remain silent and 
consequently s. 7 of the Charter was infringed. The defence claimed that there was no 
distinction between this case in terms of gathering the evidence and the Hebert case, decided by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in 199a4. The Supreme Court of Canada extended in that case 
the privilege against self-incrimination to the investigative stages of criminal proceedings. 
Hebert was unaware that his cellmate was an agent/provocateur. He was able to obtain a 
confession from Hebert, who had been advised by his lawyer to remain silent. This advice 
Hebert had clearly indicated, he wanted to comply with. The surreptitious action of police had 
violated Hebert's right to remain silent, held our highest court, and consequently the statement 
was inadmissible. A person detained by the State in the course of a criminal process has a right 
to choose whether to speak to the authorities or remain silent. Such a person must clearly have 
that choice and Hebert had been deprived of it. 
4 R. v. Hebert - See Volume 37, page 16 of this publication, 57 C.C.C. (3d), (1990) 2 
S.C.R. 15L 
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The BC Supreme Court disagreed with ·defence counsel and said there was a considerable 
distinction between this case and the issues addressed in Hebert. The accused here was not 
detained. He made a claim from ICBC and was by law compelled to submit a notarized 
statement of his claim. It was that very claim that amounted to the attempted fraud. The 
investigations and the statements were to determine the accused's entitlement to lost income, the 
normal duty of an adjuster in the course of the insurance company's business. 
In Regina v. Spyker5, Mr. Spyker faced a dangerous driving charge and the Crown sought to 
introduce the statement he was compelled to make to ICBC. The BC Courts ruled that the 
statement was inadmissible as it would amount to conscript the accused to provide testimony 
against himself. The defence also made the court aware of that case to support its claim that 
the accused's statement of loss of income was inadmissible.. The BC Supreme Court again 
disagreed and held that in Spyker the statement was a compulsory statement regarding the 
circumstances of an accident in which he was involved. In this case, the accused submitted a 
claim that was false. "The Crown is seeking to admit the statements which in themselves are 
an offence". When Mr. Spyker made his statement the offence he was charged with had already 
occurred. Again, here making the claim/statement was the offence of attempted fraud in itself. 
The statements were ruled to be admissible. 
The defence further argued that the video tapes made of the spry accused while he claimed to 
be totally disabled, were an unreasonable search and seizure and hence a violation of the 
accused's Charter Right under s. 8. 
The Court reviewed a number of cases and held that this right can only be infringed by means 
of electronic surveillance if the target person has in the circumstances a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. There was no such expectation in this case. The accused worked in the public view 
from a public place. The investigator was at all times in a public place while he taped the 
accused. It would be permissible for anyone to conduct video surveillance as it was done here. 
The tapes were also admissible in evidence. 
5 Regina v. Spyker - Volume 40, page 3 of this publication, 63 C.C.C. (3) 125. 
TAKING PICTURE TO ASSIST INVESTIGATOR 
IN IDENTIFYING THE ACCUSED IN COURT 
REGINA v. DILLING - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC910455, December 1991. 
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A police woman posed as a prostitute on a public street. The accused approached her to inquire 
about her sexual services; no deal was made. When the accused drove away he was stopped by 
two other constables who worked in concert with the police woman. Particulars were taken and 
an appearance notice was issued alleging the offence of communicating with a person for the 
purpose of obtaining sexual services from a prostitute. 
While the details were obtained one of the officers "suddenly" turned around and took a polaroid 
flash picture of the accused. The accused appealed his conviction to the BC Supreme Court 
claiming that the constable's identification of him at trial was inadmissible. The constable who 
had posed as a prostitute had been given the accused's picture about an hour after it had been 
taken "while the accused was detained" . 
It was conceded that the photograph had assisted her in matching the accused with the 
circumstances and content of their communications. She had made notes of the conversation and 
-~ttached the photograph to those notes. 
A provincial court judge in Alberta had held that there was no distinction between taking 
fingerprints or a photograph without the consent of the person printed or photographed. The 
offence is one of summary conviction and as no fingerprints can be taken without consent neither 
should a photograph, reasoned the Alberta provincial court judge. He held non compliance on 
the part of the police violates the subject's rights under s. 7 of the Charter. 
The BC Supreme Court disagreed with the Alberta decision and reasoned that the polygraph 
picture was taken for one single purpose, to assist the recollection of the undercover officer. 
Fingerprints have numerous purposes in the criminal field. It normally requires the cooperation 
of the subject to take them. Fingerprints are "given" and involve elements of participation and 
self-incrimination. It differs in every aspect from the surreptitious taking of a photograph. 
If time had been taken to make a detailed description of the accused or a sketch, this in law 
would not have been different from the taking of a picture without consent. Generally we have 
no property in our image. Said the Court: 
" ..... I remain of the view that a photograph taken in the 
circumstances ....... is nothing more than an aide-memoir similar 
to contemporary notes or a sketch". 
10 
In 1990 the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled on a challenge of the right of police to take a 
photograph of a person before his arrest. In other words, photographing an accused outside the 
provision of the Identification of Criminals Act. Because no consent is prerequisite to the taking 
of a picture following certain arrests, does not mean that consent is required where there is no 
arrest. Facial features which are fact, can be recorded by photographing the suspect. There is 
no testimonial compulsion involved in this practice. 
Provided there is not compulsion involved, (such as posing), police require no consent of a 
suspect to take his/her picture in a public place. 
To suggest that the police practice of the surreptitious taking of the photograph was a violation 
of the accused's rights to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure was "primitivist and 
inappropriate" held the court. There was no search and nothing was seized, capturing the 
accused's image on film is no seizure, said the Court. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS MADE BY MURDER VICTIM 
THAT TEND TO SHOW THAT KILLER WAS A PERSON OTHER 
THAN THE ACCUSED. HEARSAY RULE 
11 
REGINA v. CHARLEY - Court of Appeal for British Columbia, Vancouver CA 009634, 
May 1992. 
If hearsay statements and evidence in general were admissible in evidence to prove facts, 
concoction would be unlimited. Basically, witnesses must be able to vouch for the truth of what 
they say by having learned the facts of their testimony directly by one of their bodily senses. 
Unless there is an exception to this rule (there are approximately 40) hearsay evidence is 
inadmissible. 
In this case the accused had been convicted of murder. Evidence against him included 
statements he made to a number of people over a period of 10 years. Finally one of the 
recipients of these statements phoned crime-stoppers and police collected a number of consistent 
versions of the utterances by the accused. 
The defence tried to raise a reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt by depicting the victim 
of the crime as a person who did live far from an exemplary life and one who had enemies one 
or some of whom may well have been responsible for 11 slitting his throat from ear to ear" and 
· leaving his body in the back of a car. 
To adduce such evidence the defence cross-examined the woman the victim had been living with 
at the time of the murder. It showed that the victim had a sloppy life; was a heroin addict and 
was active in the drug trade. He was gone every day and all day and seldom came home before 
early morning hours. A few days before his death he ·had changed this pattern and was 
questioned about that by this witness. She related the victim's answer in her testimony. He had 
explained that "a coon had pulled a knife on him ... 11 For a period of about four days the victim 
stayed home at night and did not go out until he received a phone call which caused him to say 
that all was okay again. 
It does not take a legal expert to conclude that this hearsay evidence of what the victim had 
declared, is an important circumstance on the issue of identification. It tends to show that 
someone other than the accused had a motive to kill the victim. One may well conclude that it 
is less likely that the accused was the killer. The victim was threatened with violence by an 
unknown person with an instrument of a type that was used to kill him by a person other than 
the caucasian accused. 
There was sufficient connection between the death and the person who threatened the victim, to 
make the fact of pulling the knife and the "coon" description by the victim, logically probative 
of the issue of identification, held the BC Court of Appeal. 
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Over the last decade the Supreme Court of Canada has been rather liberal in the acceptance of 
hearsay evidence. Where such evidence is "logically probative", said the Court in 19836, of a 
matter required to be proved, then, subject to the exclusionary rule, such evidence is admissible. 
This evidence to be logically probative must logically fit in all of the evidence to support the 
issue in favour of which it was adduced. 
Another reason why the evidence was admissible was on account of it being evidence that 
"directly asserts the condition of intention or emotion, which establishes a certain state of mind." 
Such evidence of a declaration as made by the victim in this case is not to prove the truth of the 
content of what he said but only to show a certain state of mind. 
The evidence the defence sought to have admitted was "reasonably necessary" for it to show the 
possibility that a person other than the accused had a motive to, and did kill the victim. 
This leaves the reliability of the evidence to be considered. To weigh this the evidence must 
withstand four tests: 
1. There must be no alternative permissible means of adducing the hearsay evidence; 
2. the declarant (in this case the victim) did not make the statement in favour of his interest; 
3. the declaration was made before there was any dispute or litigation, so that it was made 
without bias; and 
4. the declarant must have had peculiar means of knowledge. 
What is also of interest in regard to the reliability test is that in terms of the reliability of 
persons is concerned, it is that of the declarant that is the focus of concern and not that of the 
witness through whose mouth the declaration is tendered. The credibility of the latter only goes 
to the weight to be given to the evidence. 
The declarations by the victim were admissible in evidence. 
6 Morris v. The Queen [1983] 2 S.C.R. 190 
Accused's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
13 
OBSCENITY AND THE CHARTER'S FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
REGINA v. BUTLER - Supreme Court of Canada - 70 C.C.C. (3d) 129. February 1992. 
The accused owned a Video Boutique from which he sold and rented video tapes, magazines and 
sexual paraphernalia. All the material was obscene and in excess of 170 charges were preferred 
relating to the possession and distribution of that material. The trial judge who found that the 
Crown had failed to prove the "community standard of tolerance" as to what is obscene, only 
convicted the accused on 8 counts for movies considered to be "hard porn" and obscene by any 
standard. Needless to say, the accused argued that the criminal code sections defining and 
creating offences in relation to obscene matters, were without force or effect due to being 
inconsistent with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Charter. 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and convicted the accused of all 
charges. The accused then appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) 
The S.C.C. held that the material allegedly obscene is protected by the Charters' freedom of 
expression guarantee. Those provisions in the Criminal Code that restrict obscene expressions 
must be tested by means of s.1 of the Charter to determine if they are demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society (The trial judge had tested the alleged obscene material and it 
reiterated that our Criminal Code definition of obscenity is exclusive and objective.) 
Whether or not something is obscene as defined by our Criminal Code depends on the 
community standards. What will the community allow or tolerate its members to be exposed 
to. This standard must not be established by personal morality or convictions but by what the 
community may consider harmful. In others words the definition and offences in relation to 
obscenities was not enacted to set national standard of morality or decency. That is an 
individual responsibility or discretion. These enactments are like other criminal law provisions, 
to protect us from harm. 
In other words what these laws are designed to prevent and prohibit is the possession and 
distribution of material that predisposes persons to act anti-socially, such as mistreatment of 
women and children. These laws formally identify material and activities that may encourage 
or arouse conduct that is incompatible with society's proper functioning. For these purposes the 
laws are justified under s. 1 of the Charter. 
Although undue exploitation of crime, horror, cruelty or violence are included in the definition 
of obscenity, the S.C.C. addressed itself to obscenity in regard to sex and referred to it as 
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pornography7• It is divisible into three categories: 
1. Explicit sex with violence; 
2. explicit sex without violence but which subjects people to treatment that is degrading or 
dehumanizing; and 
3. explicit sex without violence that is neither degrading nor dehumanizing. 
In regards to sex with violence the S.C.C. held that it "almost always" amounts to an undue 
exploitation of sex. In relation to category 2., the Court held that where the risk of "harm" as 
explained above, is substantial it also may be undue within the definition of obscenity. About 
category 3, the Court held that unless it employs children in its production, it will not qualify 
for undue exploitation and is simply not obscene. 
The S.C.C. also made a significant decision in holding that whether material is obscene does not 
depend on where or to whom it is shown or exposed. Furthermore, "artistic expression" is at 
the kernel of the freedom of expression. Therefore any doubt about such artistry must be 
resolved in favour of the freedom of expression. 
If the obscenity provisions in our criminal law were there to stifle expression of thought or 
feelings by means of censure then the Charter freedom of expression would cause them to be 
without force or effect. This includes material that has no redeeming value as all expression is 
entitled to be protected. However, that, as explained above, is not the purpose of those 
enactments. Considering their purpose in a free and democratic society, it simply is a 
reasonable limit placed on the freedom of expression to protect harm to that society. The Court 
was also satisfied that the definition of obscenity was not excessive for this purpose. It is 
proportionate to identify obscenity that may harm society. 
The S.C.C. acknowledged that there has to be a link between obscenity and the harm it does to 
society in terms of criminal behaviour. The court held that it is reasonable to presume that 
attitudes and beliefs do change when persons are exposed to obscene material and that there is 
a causal relationship between that exposure and that change which potentially victimizes women. 
Once again the Court warned that the section meets the "minimal impairment" test that it does 
not include in its definition nor prohibit sexually explicit erotica that is practised without 
violence and is not degrading or dehumanizing. Furthermore it does not capture in what it 
defines or prohibits materials which have scientific, artistic or literary merit. 
7 Seems S.C.C. is not following the suggestion by the Law Reform Commission that 
there is a distinction between obscenity and pornography. It, found that the former 
means words or acts not said, written or done for the purpose of causing sexual 
arousal, while the latter has failed if such arousal does not result. Arousal is to 
pornography what laughter is to comedy. Also the commission suggested that 
obscenity may be incidental while pornography is the exclusive purpose of certain 
material. Dialogue or continuity is not a necessary to pornographic material. 
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As the trial judge and the Court of Appeal for M~nitoba had not considered the impugned 
materials found in the accused's possession by these standards and principles . ... 
The accused's appeal was 
allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
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SELF-DEFENSE - EXCESSIVE APPLICATION OF FORCE -
REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF DEATH OR GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM 
REGINA v. SIU - Court of Appeal for BC - 71 C.C.C. (3d) 197. March 1992. 
The accused picked up a prostitute and drove her to a basement suite she "partially occupied". 
An argument arose over price and service. The accused had already paid some money and four 
men, solidly on the side of the prostitute, came to help her out. They argued that she should 
keep the money and evicted the accused. They smashed the back window of his car as he drove 
away. These four men were not choir boys of the neighbourhood church. They all had lengthy 
records for violent crimes and were involved in drugs, prostitution and robberies - including 
rolling prostitutes' clients while in the suite. One of them was armed with a bayonet during the 
encounter with the accused. 
The accused returned one half hour later with a loaded revolver to retrieve his driver's licence. 
As soon as he found it he left. When he heard someone shout, "You fucking chink" he stopped 
the car because he was scared despite the fact that usually people who are scared keep on going. 
One of the men who evicted him came running up pulling "something metal" from the side of 
his body. The accused fired some shots in the air and drove off, promptly colliding with a 
telephone pole. According to the accused, the man walked towards the accused's car and nicked 
the accused's cheek. This again scared the accused who then fired a number of shots killing the 
man. 
The Crown's position was that the accused returned to the scene to take revenge and shot and 
killed the deceased while he stood unarmed some distance from the accused's car. 
The accused's defence was self-defence which must have failed as a jury convicted him of 
second degree murder. The accused appealed the conviction claiming that the trial judge had 
inaccurately instructed the jury on the law with regard to self-defence. The Crown argued that 
considering the evidence, the defence of self-defence was not available - it simply had no air of 
reality. 
The BC Court of Appeal rejected the submissions by the Crown that the evidence made self-
defence unavailable to the accused. The evidence revealed that police found a knife with blood 
on the blade among the deceased's belongings. Police acknowledged that the accused had a 
scratch on his cheek that was clearly visible on the photograph police took of the accused. One 
of the four men who evicted the accused testified that he saw the deceased in the possession of 
a gun minutes before his fatal encounter. A nearby resident testified that the deceased's wife 
removed several items from her husband.' s body before police arrived on the scene. The wife 
claimed she only removed drugs and a notebook but the witness said there was more removed 
that just those two items. This, held the BC Court of Appeal, was evidence that made it 
necessary for the trial judge to instruct the jury on the law of self-defence. 
17 
The trial judge had told the jury that if in the circumstances the force and actions the accused 
used to defend himself were excessive and disproportionate in relation to the force applied to 
him, self defence was not available. This the defence counsel claimed was an error. In essence 
the trial judge had told the jury that if force used to defend oneself is excessive in relation to the 
force applied to the defender, self defence is unavailable. Needless to say that instruction is 
wrong if death was caused under a "reasonable apprehension" of death or grievous bodily harm 
on the part of the person defending himself. Considering the accused's knowledge that the 
deceased was violent and had very recently applied violence to him was evidence in support of 
the "reasonable apprehension" of death or grievous bodily harm. 
Appeal was allowed 
A new trial was ordered 
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THEFT - TAKING ADVANTAGE OF KNOWN ERROR 
REGINA v. MILNE.; Supreme Court of Canada, 70 C.C.C (3d) 481. 
The accused, owner and operator of a small company, completed his contractual obligations and 
was paid $17,000.00 by the Hudson's Bay Company. By some administrative error the H.B.C. 
paid the accused another $17,000.00. The accused, fully aware of the mistake deposited both 
cheques. Subsequently. the accused cleaned out his company's account by means of certified 
cheques payable to him and cashed them. He was convicted of theft by converting $17,000.00 
to his own use. He appealed his conviction claiming that what he had done did not amount to 
an offence known to law. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with the accused. It in essence held, that the accused had 
not deprived the H.B.C. of their money by any inducement on his part. He had not committed 
fraud or false pretence, neither had he taken the money without the H.B.C. 's consent. If that 
was the case, there would not have been a transfer of property. In this case, though it was a 
mistake, and there was a transfer of property. It was for the H.B.C., which in terms oflaw did 
knowingly transfer property to the accused to recover that property by means of civil process. 
The accused had committed no crime in these circumstances. 8 
The Crown appealed the Alberta decision to the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.). It did 
acknowledge that the reasoning of the Alberta Court of Appeal was correct at one time, but 
asserted that the trend of criminal law is now inconsistent with those reasons. Whether or not 
there is "transfer of property" or if the transaction is "void or voidable" has really little 
relevance any more in criminal law. Instead we must now focus on the acts and intent of an 
accused. Needless to say knowledge is also an important factor in this. 
The law as explained above is necessary in civil law to protect innocent third parties to whom 
the property may have passed in the meantime and who depended on the legitimacy of the 
transaction by which they obtained the property. "The criminal allegation against the accused 
in this case would not affect a property claim of an innocent third party to whom the property 
had passed in the meantime." 
" ..... the accused's knowledge of the mistake, rather than the type of mistake made" must be 
focused in a case like this. The Court reviewed some cases that were not dissimilar: 
8 Regina v. Milne - Volume 38, page 30 of this publication 59 C.C.C. (3d) 372. 
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1. Brochu v. The King (1950) 10 C.R. 183 
Brochu cashed a cheque and received, by mistake, $1000.00 more than the amount the 
cheque was for. Unlike what the trial court did in the Milne case, the Court did focus 
on the knowledge and actions of Brochu instead of analyzing the nature of the mistake 
by which he became a recipient of the extra funds. Brochu had taken these funds as well 
as converted them to his own use .. 
2. Regina v. Johnson (1978) 42 C. C. C. (2d) 249 
Johnson found that funds had been deposited in his account by mistake. In the full 
knowledge that he was not entitled to the funds he withdrew and spent them. The 
Manitoba Court of Appeal zeroed in on Johnson's knowledge and found that spending 
the money amounted to converting it to his own use. Again the type of error was made 
by the bank or its nature in law was irrelevant for the purpose of criminal law. 
Mr. Milne knew that the second cheque was issued by mistake. Therefore, for the purpose of 
criminal law, property did not pass from the Hudson's Bay Company to Mr. Milne. He took 
the property and/or converted it to his own use with the intent to deprive the H.B.C. of it. This 
was done without colour of right and fraudulently. 
Crown's appeal was allowed 
Conviction was restored 
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"ATTEMPTING TO BREAK INTO A HOME" 
PROOF REQUIRED 
REGINA v. BLENCOE - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA014678, May 1992 
Late evening, man and wife were awakened by someone knocking on their front door. The wife 
found a vantage point from where she could observe what was happening in front of her house. 
She did not recognize the person at the front door, nor the two other men just outside her 
window. Police were alerted and attended with a dog and all three youths were apprehended, 
after they did flee upon the ·arrival of police. Police also found a knapsack as well as a long 
knife that had been discarded beside a trail one of the accused used to get away from the scene. 
They were arrested and tried for attempted breaking and entering a dwelling house with the 
intent to commit an indictable offence therein. 
In regard to the accused Blancoe the Provincial Court judge had found the following inculpatory 
facts; the residents did not know the accused; they were trespassing by night; Blancoe was the 
one knocking on the door wearing a sock on one hand and mitt on the other; "the guilty always 
flee"; the house was in darkness and was apparently unoccupied, etc. · 
From these facts the trial judge had drawn the irresistible inference that, although there was no 
physical attempt to get inside, the three men were trying to break into the house. The men were 
casing their target and the knocking was part of discovering if anyone was in the house. This, 
held the trial judge, was an action that had gone beyond mere preparation stages. He found the 
accused guilty. This conviction was challenged by this accused to the Court of Appeal for BC. 
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's findings were not supported by the evidence. 
The Court of Appeal was, like the trial judge, satisfied that the youths were casing and testing 
"in preparation" to break into the home. However there was insufficient evidence to prove that 
the accused had an intent to break-in or did do anything for the purpose of carrying out that 
intention. The circumstances were at best, suspicious, due to the lack of any overt act that 
manifested such intent. If a door knob had been turned 9r some other act manifesting an intent 
to enter the home had occurred the attempt would have been proved. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Conviction set aside 
DRIVER DETAINED AND SEARCHED 
UPON SUSPICION SHE STOLE CAR. 
ADMISSIBILITY OF NARCOTIC FOUND ON HER 
REGINA v. DALSHAUG- Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver C.C. 910596 
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The accused drove a fancy car and did so quite awkwardly. She was stopped due to three 
separate traffic offences. The accused did not "fit" the car; she seem out of place in it. When 
asked if it was her car she admitted it was not. When asked if she stole the car she answered 
with the question, "Is it stolen?". She could not produce any driver's licence or any documents 
for the car, and did not have an idea who owned it. Yet the car had not been reported stolen. 
Despite not knowing any details the accused was kept in detention and removed from the scene 
in a police van. She was searched and a baggie of marihuana was found on her. She was 
convicted of possession of a narcotic and appealed the conviction claiming that the evidence had 
been obtained by means of an unreasonable search. 
The burden · of proving this alleged infringement of her right was on the accused. As the law 
stands, she has to show on the balance of probabilities that the search was warrantless and then 
the Crown must show if it was authorized by law and reasonable. The trial judge had held that 
the search was illegal but reasonable. The .strip search of the accused was, of course, not 
pursuant to the Narcotic Control Act, but incident to detention which had not resulted from a 
formal arrest. No arrest had been effected until the narcotic was found. The Court found that 
incident to "detention", a pat down search is all that is allowed to determine if there are weapons 
on the detainee. The narcotic had been found by means of a strip search. 
Although the Court sympathized with the officer considering the circumstances, nonetheless the 
evidence is that a person was pulled over for minor traffic violations and was detained and strip 
searched. 
The evidence was not 
admitted, the appeal was 
allowed and the accused was 
acquitted. 
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BEHAVIOUR AMOUNT TO THREAT OF VIOLENCE TO 
THREE TELLERS WHOSE CASH DRAWERS WERE EMPTIED; 
THREE ROBBERIES 
REGINA V. PELLETIER - Court of Appeal for Quebec, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 438. 
Robbery is taking property from its possessor, by means of violence. It is, for instance, not the 
bank that is robbed but the teller. The accused in this case, had jumped over a counter behind 
which three tellers were serving customers. The accused ordered the bank's manager to, "Get 
out of your office". The tellers backed away and the accused helped himself from all three cash 
drawers. The accused had acted aggressively and brusquely and had created a lot of noise. He 
threw one of the drawers on the floor when he had difficulty with it. Except for what he said 
to the manager he did not speak, uttered no threat, wore no mask and no weapon was visible. 
The trial judge held that the accused had robbed three tellers and he was convicted and sentenced 
accordingly. He appealed to the Court of Appeal for Quebec claiming that what he did 
amounted to theft only. Should the Court of Appeal disagree with that, then he committed only 
one robbery as his actions were continuous. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal disagreed with the accused. The accused's aggressive conduct had 
amounted to violence or at least a threat of violence. "Cooperate - get out of my way or else", 
the accused's demeanour had conveyed to the tellers, his victims. The Court also held that all 
three tellers were robbed and therefore three convictions were appropriate. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
BASED ON INFORMATION FROM PHYSICIAN WARRANTS FOR 
SEIZING BLOOD AND MEDICAL RECORDS WERE OBTAINED 
REASONABLENESS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
REGINA v. ERICKSON - Court of Appeal for Alberta, 72 C.C.C. (3d) 75. 
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The accused was seriously injured in a major motor vehicle accident. Ambulance attendants, 
hospital staff including the attending physician thought that the accused was possibly impaired. 
The driver of the other car involved was killed. The investigating officer questioned the doctor 
as to details of the analysis of the accused's blood. No details were withheld and the doctor 
showed the officer the medical records which included the accused's blood-alcohol content. 
Based on all this information the officer obtained one search warrant for . the accused's medical 
record and another for the blood that was taken for medicinal purposes. The grounds for these 
warrants were the information the doctor gave the officer. The Crown appealed the accused's 
acquittal of "over .80 mg" (180 mg%) due to the trial excluding the analysis of the accused's 
seized blood, as well as the medical records. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in regard to his medical records and the hospital analysis of the blood taken for medicinal 
purposes. The questioning of the attending doctor and.thereby seizing the information from him 
upon which the search warrants did issue, was an unreasonable search and seizure. The doctor 
was obliged to keep the medical information confidential and that information was seized 
unreasonably without a warrant. 
The officer could have obtained a warrant based on the opinions of himself and others as to the 
accused consumption of alcohol, in which case the seizure would not necessarily have been 
unreasonable. 
However, following the precedents on this point of law, the Court of Appeal held that the 
evidence was real and existed prior to and irrespective of the Charter violation. It could have 
been discovered in any event. Had the doctor only told the officer that a blood sample had been 
taken and was kept, ·nothing improper would have occurred in these circumstances. In any 
event, admitting the evidence as it was would not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
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POLICE OFFICERS QUESTIONING AND 
SEARCHING A SUSPICIOUS PERSON. 
ADMISSIBILITY OF NARCOTIC FOUND 
REGINA v. ARRUDA - Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver CC 010220 
Two constables in a patrol car saw the accused running across the street carrying a duffle bag. 
It was late evening and the area was a target of B & E's and theft from cars. The officer turned 
around and caught up with the accused on a path way through some bushes that led to a trailer 
park where the accused lived. 
From here-on-in the versions of what happened are quite distinct from one another. 
The officers testified that they had asked the accused to come back to the sidewalk where they 
asked him for identification and to give an account of himself. The accused had complied and 
told the two officers that he had come from a nearby bus stop. They had asked him for 
permission to search the duffle bag and he answered, "Sure. Go ahead". He explained the 
origin of various items he had in the bag as well as the $1689. 00 that caused a bulge in his 
pants. However, he failed to do so with regard to a quantity of marihuana cigarettes he had in 
the bag. Just before the bag was searched and the marihuana found, one of the officers had 
asked, "You don't mind if I look through the bag?" to which the reply was, "No, I don't care". 
The accused was arrested for possession and despite his claim that the marihuana was for 
personal use, he was prosecuted for possession for the purpose of trafficking. The officers could 
not think of authority to conduct the search as they lacked r~asonable and probable grounds. 
They had depended solely on the accused's permission. There was no evidence that the accused 
was told or was aware that he need not answer the officers probing questions or allow them to 
search his person and the bag. 
The accused's evidence did not contradict the facts as related by the officer but simply did shed 
a different light on it. The trial judge believed the accused when he said not to feel free to leave 
or to challenge the officer's authority. At one point the accused claimed to have been ordered, 
"Stand there and don't move." 
The Crown conceded that most likely the search of the bag and the person of the accused prior 
to the marihuana having been found was unreasonable. The defence lawyer called the whole 
thing a "proverbial fishing expedition". The officers were simply curious and at best suspicious. 
The Court did agree with both views and said the only issue was whether admitting the evidence 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The officer had been suspicious that the accused may have committed on indictable offence. 
Considering what occurred it was reasonable for the accused that he had no choice but to stay 
where he was and to consent to the officers searching the bag. He was not told he was free to 
refuse. 
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The evidence was real and the questioning and searching were not done in bad faith ( not 
meaning there was "good faith"). They did what they thought was appropriate in the 
suppression of B & E's and thefts from cars. The trial would not be rendered unfair if the 
evidence was admitted and the alleged offence is serious. Hence the administration of justice 
would not be brought into disrepute if the evidence was admitted. 
Marihuana was admitted in 
evidence 
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CARRYING A RIFLE WRAPPED IN A JACKET ON PUBLIC 
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM - CONCEALMENT WITHOUT EVIL 
OR UNLAWFUL INTENT - OFFENCE MADE OUT 
REGINA v. FELA WKA - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver, CA 00986~, December 1991 
The accused, a contractor by trade, wore his green coveralls when he and a friend when target 
shooting with his 22 calibre rifle. On the way home the accused spent some time at his friend's 
and took the public transit system home. He carried his rifle wrapped in his jacket. Passengers 
reported to the transit security police that a man wearing fatigues carried a rifle. He was 
approached and asked what he carried in his jacket and the accused had laughingly answered, 
"I'm on a killing spree". He transferred to a bus and was apprehended by police who charged 
the accused with carrying a concealed weapon and carrying it for a purpose dangerous to the 
public peace. 
The trial judge accepted that the accused had been facetious, and had said to be on a "killing 
spree" in jest. However, despite the fact that the court accepted that the accused did not carry 
the rifle concealed for some evil or unlawful purpose, but only as he considered "carrying it in 
the open would be inappropriate", he was convicted of carrying the rifle concealed. He appealed 
that conviction submitting that his purpose was an innocent one and to prevent passengers from 
being alarmed. 
The Crown had proved "carrying", "weapon" and "concealment" and the question to be 
answered by the Court of Appeal for BC was whether the Crown must also show the mental 
element of some evil or unlawful purpose on the part of the accused. For such an element not 
to be an essential one in an offence for which a person can be imprisoned is clearly an 
infringement of s. 7 of the Charter, urged the defence counsel. Indeed, there has to be an intent 
answered the Court, but was this an intent to conceal or an intent to conceal for an evil or 
unlawful purpose? The Court of Appeal held that the criminal intent required by the section is 
the putting out of sight of a weapon for the purpose of concealment. 
The court considered Parliament's intent for enacting this offence. In other words, "What was 
Parliament attempting to remedy?" It clearly wants to protect the community from persons 
carrying hidden weapons. Said the Court: 
"Philosophically most Canadians are antipathetic to improper use 
of weapons of any kind." 
The offence mandates that people who lawfully carry a weapon do that in ·a manner that 
forewarns everyone, enabling them to make an informed decision how to respond. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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Comment: 
The section that creates this offence seems to be flawed in terms of equal application. There 
are many so-called neutral items the classification of which depends on what we intend to use 
them for when we carry them. Other times are weapons because of design or intend of the 
manufacturer. If we carry a neutral item the Crown has to prove the essential mental element 
that converts that item into a weapon. When we carry something designed as a weapon, even 
for an innocent purpose, then the offence does not have evil or unlawful intent as a prerequisite. 
In essence the definition of weapon causes this offence to vary from a strict liability offence to 
one requiring specific intent; depending on what is carried and concealed. Only when we carry 
what is classified as a weapon must we at all times do so with that weapon exposed, probably 
scaring a good number of the public, but enabling them to decide how to respond. Probably this 
is now a good way of securing a seat on the bus. Many may get off at the next stop whether 
or not that is their destination. 
If appealed further it seems not impossible that the Supreme Court of Canada will hold that 
unlawful and evil intent is an essential element to this offence. 
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DEMAND FOR BLOOD SAMPLES MUST INCLUDE 
ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL BE TAKEN BY A DOCTOR 
REGINA v. GREEN - Supreme Court of Canada, February 1992, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 285. 
A police officer demanded the accused give samples of blood as in the opinion of a qualified 
person were needed to determine the concentration of alcohol in his blood. This demand was 
read from a card and ended by warning that refusal to comply would result in criminal charges. 
The accused did refuse and claimed at trial that the demand the officer made was inadequate. 
The Nova Scotia trial court and its Court of Appeal agreed with the accused and acquitted him. 
The Crown then took its plight to the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.). 
The argument was that the Parliament, when it enacted the provision in the Criminal Code for 
the blood sample demand, did include a safeguard and direction that (not the likes of Dracula 
but) a practising medical practitioner only must take or direct the taking of the blood samples. 
The Courts held that this provision is not only a safeguard or directive but also an assurance to 
the person subject to the demand that proper medical procedures will be followed. The health 
circumstances of some persons or sheer apprehension may cause them to refuse to comply. 
Inclusion of this assurance, that a doctor will be in charge and that no blood will be taken where 
it may in the opinion of that doctor endanger the life or health of the detained person (the 
demand triggers detention) is essential . The right to counsel, is part of the remedy to convey 
to the detained person the statutory assurance but is insufficient by itself, reasoned the S.C.C. 
"Parliament's purpose appears to be directed to putting to rest the 
fear that an improper procedure might be followed or that 
unqualified persons might conduct the procedure". 
The exclusion of this assurance in the demand made of the accused caused that demand to be 
invalid. The refusal was consequently not an offence. 
The S.C.C. approved of the sentence police in Nova Scotia added to the demand after its Court 
of Appeal upheld the acquittal: 
"Blood samples will only be taken by or under the direction of a 
qualified medical practitioner and if the medical practitioner is 
satisfied that the taking of the samples will not endanger your life 
or health." 
Crown's appeal was dismissal 
Acquittal was upheld 
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ALIBI EVIDENCE AND ITS WEIGHT 
REGINA v. McCALLUM - Supreme Court of BC, Victoria 63120, April 1992 
The accused was positively identified in a photographic line-up as well as in the courtroom, by 
the victim of a drugstore robbery. 
The accused, who did not testify, produced three witnesses who said that the accused was with 
them at the time of the robbery. These witnesses who had no criminal records, had, despite 
their knowledge that there was a Canada-wide warrant for the accused's arrest, sheltered, aided 
and abetted him to keep him out of the hands of the authorities. They also assisted in attacking 
the identity evidence. These witnesses, the accused's common-law wife and the couple they 
were staying with, testified that on the morning of the day of the robbery the accused had shaved 
off a few days growth of beard. The victim of the robbery had testified that the robber was in 
need of a shave due to a growth of several days. 
Three months after the robbery and two months before the trial, defence counsel gave notice to 
the Crown that alibi evidence was to be adduced. This was in compliance with precedents 
dictating that the defence must give the Crown at the first reasonable time (not first available 
time) notice of alibi evidence. Neither the Crown nor the defence have property in their 
witnesses and the Crown must have time and opportunity to investigate the claim that the 
accused person was at the time of the crime at a location other than the scene. In this case it 
seems that the witnesses' evidence was for that purpose put in affidavits and when police 
approached the witnesses they refused to be interviewed and had nothing to say other than refer 
to the sworn statements. There is no obligation on the part of a witness to cooperate or say 
anything, acknowledged the Court. 
The Crown argued that in weighing the testimony of the alibi witnesses, the Court had to 
consider the fact that the accused had not testified. In Vezzeau v. The Queen (C.R.N.S. Volume 
34, 309), a witness testified that he had been in the company of Vezzeau miles away from the 
crime scene at the time of the offence. He, like the accused McCallum had not testified. The 
trial judge had directed the jury that they were not to attach any consideration to that fact. Said 
the Supreme Court of Canada in allowing the Crown's appeal from Vezzau's acquittal: 
"The failure of an accused person, who relies upon an alibi to 
testify and thus to submit himself to cross-examination, is a matter 
of importance in considering the validity of that defence." 
In this case, the Crown had received reasonable notice. There had been no investigation to 
speak of by Police and there was no evidence that the alibi was a fabrication. In terms of the 
accused's failure to testify the Court held that there had been no evidence that the alibi witnesses 
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were of bad character and they were not shaken by thorough cross-examination. In other words, 
their credibility remained intact. 
Accused acquitted. 
ADMISSIBILITY OF MURDER VICTIM'S DECLARATION 
AS TO ACCUSED'S MOTIVE FOR KILLING 
REGINA V. LEMKY - BC Court of Appeal, Vancouver CA 013096 - August, 1992 
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A declaration made by the victim of a homicide shortly before dying has recently been tested 
on several occasions for admissibility in evidence. This must not be confused with a dying 
declaration a well known exception to the hearsay rule. That is a statement made by a victim 
after the cause of death has been inflicted and that person, fully aware that death is imminent 
and inevitable, makes statements as to the identity of the perpetrator or the cause of death. The 
victim must have no hope whatever of recovery. The situation must be so solemn and awful that 
every motive to falsehood is silenced. Such state of mind is the equivalent of an oath and the 
law permits such a statement to be admitted as proof of the truth of its content. 
The declaration in question in this case was made by the victim of the murder the Crown alleged 
the accused committed. The Crown as part of its case, set out to prove that the accused had a 
motive to murder his common-law wife. She had told her mother and her brother, days before 
she was shot in the neck by the accused, that she wanted out of the relationship. The accused's 
drinking had made things impossible. The evidence of a pathologist was that there were bruises 
and injuries indicative of assault inflicted very shortly before death occurred. The Crown did 
convince a jury that the gunshot was not accidental but that it was a domestic murder motivated 
by the victim wanting to permanently end her relationship with the accused. 
The state of mind of the victim with regard to her intention to leave the accused was introduced 
by testimony from the victim's mother and her brother. This, the accused argued when he 
appealed his conviction for a second degree murder, was inadmissible hearsay evidence. 
The BC Court of Appeal responded by saying that all the recent cases on this point are clear. 
When the Crown includes such declarations in its "Statement of Facts" and relies on the motive 
by proving as in this case, that the death was not accidental, the declarations are admissible. 
The declaration showed the victim's state of mind relevant to the accused's motive for taking 
her life. When such declaration withstands the test of reliability it is admissible in evidence. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
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DOES NON DISCLOSURE TO A SEX PARTNER 
THAT ONE IS INFECTED WITH AIDS VIRUS CAUSE 
THE ACT TO AMOUNT TO AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT? 
REGINA v. SSENYONGA - 73 C.C.C. (3d) 216, Ontario Provincial Court 
The accused, knowing he was infected with AIDS virus, had consensual sexual intercourse with 
three women who were consequently found to be H.I. V. positive. 
Due to endangering these women's lives, the Crown alleged that the accused had committed 
aggravated sexual assault. It claimed that the consent had been negated due to it having been 
obtained by means of fraud. 
The precedents indicated that fraud to gain consent is a deception causing the other person to 
have a misconception about the nature of the act they consent to. If a physician, for instance, 
would claim the act to be therapeutic, solely to gain consent, then what the person consented to 
did not happen. However, if the deceptor claims to have a certain status or promises some 
reciprocal service or favour, the consent remains intact. 
At this preliminary hearing the defence claimed that the women did not misunderstand the nature 
or quality of unprotected sexual intercourse. Failure on the part of the accused to tell the 
women of his AIDS is in that second category of consent as it is collateral to the act itself. The 
fraud here had nothing to do with the quality and .nature of the act of sexual intercourse or with 
the identity of the accused. Therefore the defence claimed there had been consent and 
consequently there was no assault. 
The issue of consent was compared to the implied consent of a hockey player. In one case the 
Courts found in 19919 that a deliberate cross-check to the back of the neckof a player exceeded 
the implied consent he gave for the physical contact in a rough game. A conviction resulted. 
The Crown argued in as much as the player could not consent to the cross-check and the 
resulting serious injuries, neither could the accused consider to have consent from these women 
to have sexual intercourse with him if they knew about his viral infection. It simply extends 
beyond the norm of conduct to which one can validly consent. 
9 Regina v. Leclerc, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 563. 
Also see Regina v. Jobiden (1991) 66 C.C.C. (3d) 454. Volume 41, page 14 of this 
publication. 
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Considering the "horrific medical consequences" , the presence of AIDS is a new concern for 
the Court. The arguments the Crown advanced with regard to the issue of consent, supported 
that a properly instructed jury may re.turn a verdict of guilty. 
The accused was ordered to 
stand trial. 
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POLICE OFFICER STOPPING PERSON LEAVING 
SCENE OF A FIGHT. POLICE AUTHORITY. 
REGINA v. LANGEMAN - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC 910752, July 1992 
Police officers attended at a home where a fight was reported. A woman met the officers and 
gave them information what was or had been going on inside. When the officers entered the 
home it was very obvious that there had been quite a fight. The accused immediately tried to 
leave and seemed anxious to do so. The accused was asked in undiplomatic terms, "Where do 
you think you are going?" The accused had responded with language unheard of in diplomatic 
circles, indicating he was not staying around until the officers had conducted some investigation. 
When his path was blocked the accused "took a full, left handed, backhand swing" at the face 
of one of the officers. Due to moving his head back, the swing only brushed the officer's nose. 
Consequently the accused was convicted of assaulting a peace officer in the lawful execution of 
his duty. The accused appealed the conviction and the main grounds were related to the 
lawfulness of the actions of the officers. 
The case had been complicated by the trial judge having made some errors. The trial judge had 
held that what the officers were told by the woman before entering the house was hearsay and 
inadmissible in evidence. In 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada10 reiterated that such 
evidence is not received to prove the truth of the content of the statement, but only to prove the 
state of mind of the receiver to determine whether he/she had sufficient grounds or beliefs to 
justify their actions. Due to the trial judge erroneously not allowing the evidence the appeal 
court justice (BC Supreme Court) had to decide on the kernel question of this appeal without the 
benefit of this crucial information. 
As it turned out, the accused had no involvement in the fight. The trial judge had held that the 
accused had contributed to the dilemma as he had not done anything to show this. This was also 
erroneous as the accused was not obliged to do so . . 
The trial judge had also fruled to consider whether the accused had been detained by police. The 
Supreme Court justice held that the accused was detained as soon as the officers stopped him 
from leaving. 
The defence argued that since the accused was detained as soon as the officer accosted him, and 
as they did not tell him of his right to counsel, they were not in the lawful performance of their 
duty. The Supreme Court found that after the officer told the accused he was not going 
anywhere, there had been no time for him to say anything else as this was followed immediately 
10 Regina v. Collins (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 - Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
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by a struggle. This had been a finding of fact by the trial judge with which the Appeal Court 
Justice could not interfere. Due to this fact the officer's lawful execution of duty was intact. 
Defence counsel then argued that the officers had no grounds to detain the accused. He 
therefore had a right to resist the detention . • At least, the lack of grounds caused the officers not 
to be in the lawful execution of their quty. The Court held that the officer had the right to stop 
the accused for the purpose of enhancing his investigation. However there was no "correlative 
duty" on the accused to stop on the constable's instructions. When the accused, who had not 
been involved in the fight under investigation, refused to stop the officer either had to arrest or, 
if he did not want to do so, let him go. This did not get that far. The detention, as momentary 
and "such as it was", was merely a reasonable step in the officers investigation. With the instant 
hostile gesture of the accused there was not time for those decisions or assessment of grounds. 
Had the accused not assaulted the officer and, for instance, had asked if he was under arrest and 
had wanted to leave when the answer was "No", it would have progressed into a situation as 
defence counsel claimed it was. As it stood in these circumstances the officer was in the 
execution of his duty. 
Accused's appeal dismissed, 
Conviction upheld 
36 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF THE COURT 
UNITED NURSES (Union) OF ALBERTA v. ALBERTA - [1992] 1. S.C.R. 901, April 
1992. 
"The United Nurses" were by directive of a labour board under the Labour Code of Alberta, 
ordered not to strike. This order was filed with Queen's Bench of Alberta and was according 
to the Code, the equivalent of an order of that Court. 
The Union did go on strike contrary to the order and was consequently found to be in criminal 
contempt of the Court on two motions and fined $250,000 and $150,000 respectively. 
These convictions were appealed and finally ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) 
The interesting questions asked of that Court were: 1. Does a Union have the status to be found 
in criminal contempt? 2. Does the offence of criminal contempt violate the Charter? 3. Can 
a prohibition order issued by a provincial board and filed with a Court give rise to criminal 
contempt? 
A Union is a corporate entity under a provincial labour statute. The provincial societies acts do 
all recognize that entities incorporated under another statute is nonetheless a society. 
Incorporation is done for the pursuit of a common objective and as such the entity can contact 
and be contracted, sue and be sued, and is as an entity, liable under criminal law. A union is 
a society and may be prosecuted under the Criminal Code. Hence they have the Status to be 
found in criminal contempt. (This answered Question #1) 
The Criminal Code does not define criminal contempt but only provides a punishment for the 
offence. As such, criminal contempt is an offence at common law. Section 9 of the Criminal 
Code states specifically that not withstanding anything in any statute, no person shall be 
convicted of an offence at common law. Consequently the Courts and not Parliament, have 
created and defined criminal contempt: (a historical development that is quite interesting). For 
a criminal contempt the Crown must prove that the accused "in a public way" defied or 
disobeyed a court order. That is the "actus reus" (the wrongful act) of the criminal act. The 
"mens rea" (criminal intent) required for this offence is that the accused intended or knew, or 
was indifferent that his/her public defiance or disobedience tended to depreciate the authority of 
the court. As publicity is a requisite component of criminal contempt, an accused person can 
predict in advance if his/her defiance is consequently not inconsistent with s. 7 of the charter. 
(This answered Question #2) 
The creation of the labour board, its authority to issue an order prohibiting a strike and the 
provision that filing such an order with a court of superior jurisdiction causes that order to be 
the equivalent of an order of tha~ Court, were enacted by the Alberta Provincial Legislature. 
Violation of this provincial law and its procedures caused this Union to be convicted of a 
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criminal offence. Our constitution clearly provides that the Parliament of Canada has exclusive 
jurisdiction to create criminal law and its procedures. In other words the accused Union claimed 
that indirectly the provincial lawmakers had overstepped the boundaries of their legislative 
jurisdiction. 
The S.C.C. disagreed with this argument and said that filing the orders by the provincial board, 
caused it to have the same force and effect as an order of that superior court. The Union was 
consequently convicted of disobeying an order of that Court rather than an order of the 
provincial labour board. 
The Union had argued that such reasoning was erroneous and in essence defective in logic and 
reason. The Justice of a Court of superior jurisdiction who entertains a motion for contempt of 
an order made by another Justice of that superior Court, does not have the power to judge the 
order for validity. As only the filing of the order by the provincial labour board causes it to 
have the force and effect of an order by a Court of superior jurisdiction, the Justice entertaining 
the motion for contempt should have the power to judge the validity of the defied order when . 
issued by an inferior tribunal. The S.C.C. held that validity of the order is not an issue in 
criminal contempt. The validity cannot be tested by defiance of the order. There are 
alternatives means to challenge the directive order the labour board issued. 
The convictions were upheld. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
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ACCUSED IN POSSESSION OF LARGE 
QUANTITY OF NARCOTICS. NO EVIDENCE 
OF KNOWLEDGE THAT SUBSTANCE WAS A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE 
REGINA v. WING HONG TO - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 012992, July 
1992. 
The accused made a short trip to the place of his descent, Hong Kong. His passport did 
unexplainably not show the usual immigration stamps associated with the trip. Upon his return, 
he had not gone to the apartment he shared with friends, but had booked into a hotel for a 
couple of days, using an address he had in Toronto some years ago. After this he returned to 
the apartment, where he also had the use of his friends' car. Five days after his arrival from 
Hong Kong the accused was seen walking from the apartment building to the friends' car 
carrying two plastic bags. He placed the bags in the car and was arrested. It was found that 
the one bag contained rented video tapes and the other 4.4 pounds of 96% pure heroin. No 
fingerprints were found on the inside of the plastic bag containing the heroin. 
The testimony of the accused at his trial for possession for the purpose of trafficking was that 
a man known to him as "Big Head Chee" (who he had met only once some two or three months 
ago) had phoned him and had asked that he place the plastic bag to be found in a certain 
cupboard, in the friends' car and leave the key in the ignition. The accused said he figured the 
car would be returned at some time and then he would return the video tapes. He wanted them 
in the car so he would be reminded to return them. Hence the accused did not know that the 
bag contained a forbidden substance, let alone that it was heroin. The latter, of course is not 
an essential element the Crown has to prove, but the former clearly is. 
The trial judge had held that if the accused's explanation is capable of being true, he provided 
himself with a defence. However, he found that considering all the circumstances, the lack of 
logic and the absurdity of the accused's version of events made the explanation incapable of 
belief. He therefore drew the irresistible inference from the lack of any other rational 
conclusion that the accused had the required knowledge and was guilty as charged. 
The accused appealed his conviction and argued that the trial judge had not been entitled to find 
the accused guilty simply because he did not believe his explanations. The BC Court of Appeal 
did agree that it was not "jurisprudentially correct to infer guilt merely from disbelieving the 
evidence of the accused." After all, "rejection of evidence by an accused cannot become 
positive evidence of the accused's guilt." However, evidence given by an accused which is 
proved to be false may cause an inference of a guilty conscience. The crucial question in cases 
like these is the reason for the accused to lie. He can do so for many reasons other than a guilty 
conscience related to the crime for which he is on trial. 
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In this case the accused had simply been disbelieved and the Crown failed to show that what the 
accused said amounted to falsehoods. Hence, said the defence, the trial judge had merely 
speculated that the disbelieved testimony was proof of guilt rather than a legitimate inference of 
such a conclusion. 
Another question raised was the issue of criminal intent. Where the Crown proves that an 
accused had possession of a forbidden substance, must it then not also prove that the accused 
had knowledge that it was such a substance? All the Crown did in this case was prove that the 
accused had possession of a substance that happened to be heroin. It failed to prove that the 
accused knew that he was carrying a forbidden substance (the Crown need not prove knowledge 
on the part of an accused that he knew what the forbidden substance was). If there is an onus 
on an accused to show that he lacked criminal intent (as the accused had attempted in this case) 
then surely the burden of that proof is not beyond a reasonable doubt but on the balance of 
probabilities. 
The Court of Appeal reiterated the law as they had stated it in previous cases. It applied to a 
rule that is somewhat akin to that where "recent possession" is an issue. There comes a time 
when someone is so surrounded by incriminating circumstances that he either explains or stands 
condemned. The BC Court of Appeal held that it is legitimate to infer guilty knowledge from 
physical possession. However, that inference is displaced if an explanation is given that raises 
a reasonable doubt about such knowledge or raises inferences consistent with innocence. This 
reasoning will distinguish inference from speculation in regards to disbelieved evidence. 
Regardless of the trial judge not having adequately explored these issues, the Court of Appeal 
unanimously decided that all the evidence and the broad facts in this case justified drawing the 
inference that the accused knew that the bag he carried contained a prohibited substance. The 
large quantity alone made it unlikely that it would be entrusted to a stranger. This coupled with 
the suspicious conduct of the accused and his disbelieved testimony "make it impossible to draw 
any inferences which would displace the legitimate inference which may be drawn from physical 
possession that he knew what he was possessing." 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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INADEQUATE "RIGHT TO COUNSEL" WARNING 
CAUSING EVIDENCE OF REFUSAL TO BE EXCLUDED 
REGINA V. BLANCHARD - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC920213, July, 1992. 
The investigating officer had made a proper demand from the accused to give samples of breath. 
With regard to informing the accused of his right to counsel the officer had not used the printed 
card he had been issued for that purpose. In testimony he had given different versions and 
words of the message he had conveyed to the accused. According to the officer he had in 
essence said to the accused. 
"That he could consult a lawyer if he wished and that if he did not 
know any lawyers or could not afford one he would be provided 
with a list of legal aid who could assist him at no charge." 
This fell short of the three separate routes to legal counsel, the Supreme Court of Canada said 
in 199011 must be included in the Charter warning. They are, the right (a) to consult and retain 
counsel without delay; (2) that if the suspect cannot afford counsel legal aid is available to 
him/her; and (3) that there is duty counsel who is immediately available without charge, to 
advise him/her. 
The trial judge held that what the officer had told the accused was adequate. He had held that 
telling that counsel may be consulted without delay and that duty counsel are available for that 
purpose fulfilled the requirement of creating awareness of immediate availability of duty counsel. 
When the accused appealed his conviction for refusing to blow, the Supreme Court Justice held 
that the trial judge was wrong. The three essential components were not included in the 
information the officer gave the accused in an effort to comply with his Charter obligations to 
the person he detained. 
Considering this infringement of the accused's right to counsel the defence moved that the 
evidence of the accused's refusal to blow be excluded from evidence. Needless to say that 
evidence amounted to the very crime alleged. The Crown claimed that this evidence was real 
and should not be excluded while the defence claimed the refusal to be "self-generated" 
inculpatory evidence. The former should only be excluded in "the rarest of cases" while to get 
exclusion for the latter a very low threshold only is facing the accused. 12 
11 Regina v. Brydges (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 330. 
12 Regina v. Collins (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1. Also see Volume 27, page 1 of this 
publication. 
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The court did not actually determine what category the evidence of refusal belongs to. It simply 
held that the offence may well have occurred due tb the breach of the accused's right. Had he 
been told that duty counsel were readily available for him to consult, he would have been 
informed that in the absence of a reasonable excuse, he had to comply with the demand. 
Consequently the trial judge should have disallowed the evidence of refusal. 
Accused's appeal · allowed 
Acquittal set aside. 
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IS "CARE OR CONTROL" INCLUDED IN "OPERATING" 
WITH REGARD TO A MOTOR VEHICLE? 
REGINA v. STEVENOT - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver 012620 
The applicable part of the "drinking and driving" offence section reads as follows: 
"Every one commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle ..... . 
or has the care or control of a motor vehicle ..... whether it is in 
motion or not ..... etc." 
The accused was involved in an accident and was convicted of having the "care or control of a 
motor vehicle" while his blood/alcohol level was in excess of "80 milligrams". He appealed 
claiming that since the latest amendment to s. 253 C.C. it should be construed as saying: 
"Every one commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle or 
who not being the operator of a motor vehicle has the care or 
control of the motor vehicle ..... " 
In other words "care or control" is no longer included in "driving". 
The Court of Appeal responded that whether or not "operating" and "care or control" are 
separate or included offenses is irrelevant to this case. It has to do with the construction of the 
section and whether or not the accused committed the offence alleged. 
The Supreme Court of Canada had addressed this issue in Regina v. Toews13 claimed the 
defence and although it had not said so directly it did support his submission. The BC Court 
of Appeal said the S.C.C. did nothing of the sort. It simply addressed the issue of when 
someone can be in care or control short of driving the car. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
13 Regina v. Toews - Volume 22, page 24 of this publication. 
Also see Ford v. The Queen - Volume 5, page 23. 
MEANING OF S. 101 C.C.C - ARMED ROBBERY -
POLICE STOPPING SUSPICIOUS CAR 
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REGINA v. CATROPPA - Supreme Court of BC, New Westminster X030083, May 1992. 
In response to an armed robbery call from a convenience store, one officer attended the scene, 
a dog master arrived to conduct an area search and another officer patrolled the surrounding 
streets looking for. anything that may be connected with the robbery. The robber was reported 
to have a pistol or revolver. The officer patrolling the adjacent streets observed a car driving 
away without its headlights on. He stopped the car and was given permission to look in the 
trunk where nothing was found. The accused, who was the driver and lone occupant of the car 
was told of the armed robbery that had taken place nearby. The accused was nervous and asked 
questions about the robbery. He gave an account for his presence in the neighbourhood that was 
quickly proven to be false. The officer also learned that the police dog had picked up a trail 
from the scene that had ended right where the accused's car was parked. With this the officer 
informed the accused he was being detained for armed robbery and that he had a right to 
counsel. The officer then observed from outside the car that something was stuffed between the 
front seats. This turned out to be a nylon stocking. The accused was then formally arrested for 
armed robbery and "Chartered". The car was completely searched and a pellet gun with the 
appearance of a semi-automatic pistol was found in the back seat. Needless to say, the defence 
attacked. the actions of police. The accused's consent to search was a nullity as the right to 
counsel warning had not been promptly given at the initial stages of the encounter. Without that 
consent there was at that time no reasonable basis for a warrantless search. Hence the search 
was unreasonable and the evidence should be excluded, argued the defence. 
There were three stages to the encounter in regard to detention. There was the stopping of the 
accused's car as he drove without lights in the vicinity of a recently committed armed robbery. 
Then the falsehood for being in the vicinity and the evidence of the dog leading his master from 
the scene to the very spot, where the accused had entered his car, caused the officer to "detain" 
the accused. The third stage was the formal arrest after finding the stocking in the front seat. 
The consent to search was given during the first stage. The Crown countered that the officer 
had authority to search under the provisions of section 101 C.C. It provides that reasonable 
and probable grounds justify the search of a person, conveyance or any place other than a 
dwelling house where the grounds relate to the use of firearm in the commission of a crime. 
The Court had some problems in holding that the accused was detained during the first stage of 
the encounter. The officer was properly suspicious considering the circumstances. During this 
stage he did not accuse the accused of anything and had no intention of taking him into custody 
for anything. Until a person's freedom is threatened by the exercise of the power of arrest or 
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detention for some offence, there is no detention as it is meant by the Charter to trigger the 
obligation on the part of the authority to make. the suspect aware of his/her right to counsel, held 
the Court. 
The so-called "Judge's Golden Rules" as well as our common law, recognize that police have 
a right to speak to anyone to discover the author of a crime. When they do so, they need not 
"Charter" every citizen they accost. 
The Court also rejected the suggestion of the Crown thats. 101 C.C. had application in the case. 
That would mean that if a crime was committed with the assistance of a firearm (to overcome 
the resistance of a victim) the police may randomly search vehicles no matter what the 
circumstances are. The section clearly does not target these contingencies but only offenses 
related to the firearms laws. 
The question was, considering all of the circumstances, whether the law prescribes a warrant 
to search, or if not, the searches carried out by the officer were reasonable. Given what the 
officer knew, coupled with the accused's consent to search, the search was not unreasonable. 
The accused was detained when the searches of the car took place. He had been Chartered by 
then. Consequently there was no infringement of his Charter rights. 
The evidence was admitted. 
DELAY IN MAKING DEMAND FOR ROADSIDE BREA TH SAMPLE -
- RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES - BROAD 
MEANING OF "FORTHWITH". 
REGINA v. FLINN - Supreme Court of BC, New Westminster, X030410, May 1992. 
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The accused was involved in an accident. In the opinion of the attending officer the accused 
could have had too much to drink. He asked the accused to sit in the police car and then 
radioed for a roadside screening device to be delivered to the scene. Ten minutes later the 
device arrived. During the wait the officer told the accused "what was going to take place". 
He did not give him a warning of any kind nor did he advise him. When the device was there 
the officer made the roadside demand and the accused complied "forthwith". This avoided the 
legal difficulties encountered lately with officers making the demand and then requesting the 
delivery. So far the Courts have ruled that the suspect is to comply forthwith. If the device is 
not available when the demand is made there is no obligation on the suspect to comply. 
The accused failed the roadside test and the breathalyzer analyses indicated a blood/alcohol level 
well above the legal limit. He was convicted of "over 80 mg." and appealed claiming that the 
officer had been obliged to make the roadside demand "forthwith". The defence conceded that 
it is now trite law that a person detained under the provisions of the Criminal Code in regards 
to the roadside breath test need not to be advised of their right to counsel. However the 
detention for the purpose must be in the spirit and technically be in compliance with those 
provisions. Where the accused was detained for 10 minutes as was the case here, he should 
have been advised of his right to counsel. The section was interpreted by the Courts so it could 
meet its objective. The spirit of the section is to screen with the least inconvenience or 
encroachment on the rights of a suspect. The Court held that the demand to provide "forthwith" 
a sample of breath must be made as soon as the officer has determined that there might be 
excessive alcohol in the blood of the suspect. 
Due to the 10 minute delay and detention, the precedent that a suspect need not to be notified 
of his right to counsel when a demand for a roadside breath sample is made, did simply not 
apply. 
Accused's 
allowed. 
aside. 
appeal was 
Conviction set 
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OFFICER QUESTIONING DRIVER IF HE HAS BEEN DRINKING -
DOES THE OFFICER HA VE TO TELL SUSPECT HE HAS A RIGHT TO SILENCE? 
REGINA v. BACON - Supreme Court of BC, New Westminster X029189, May 1992. 
The accused was stopped in a roadblock and was questioned if he had anything to drink. As he 
denied this and as the officer seemed convinced that the accused had been drinking, a number 
of questions were put to him. Finally the accused admitted that he had attended a party and had 
been drinking up to 30 minutes ago. He was then demanded to blow in the screening device. 
When the accused failed the test he was "processed" as per usual and the breath analysis showed 
a blood I alcohol content greater than 80 milligrams. The defence counsel successfully argued 
that the accused's right to remain silent had been infringed as he had not been informed, before 
being questioned whether he had been drinking, that he was not required to say · anything. 
Without such a warning that right is illusory held the trial judge and he acquitted the accused. 
The Crown appealed this verdict. 
The Supreme Court of BC immediately went to the heart of the issue. There is no doubt that 
during pre-trial detention a suspect has the right to remain silent, but does he have a right to be 
so informed? The Hebert decision 14 by the Supreme Court of Canada emphasizes the right of 
a detained person to make "a meaningful choice" whether to speak or remain silent. When that 
right of choice is violated the statements may be rejected by the Courts. In other words the right 
is an option to be exercised only by those who are aware and understand. However, that is the 
way the majority of our highest Court did rule. That has also been the opinion of the BC Court 
of Appeal before15 and after16 the Hebert decision. 
Concluded the BC Supreme Court: 
" ...... there was no obligation on Constable J. to inform the 
respondent of his right to silence and in answering the questions 
put to him he waived that right." 
14 Regina v. Hebert - Volume 37, Page 16 of this publication, (1990) - 57 C.C.C. (3d) 
1. 
15 Regina v. Van Den Meerssche (1989) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 449 - Volume 36, page 35 of 
this publication. 
16 Regina v. Van Haarlem - Volume 39, Page 24 of this publication (1991) 64 C.C.C. 
(3d) 543. 
IDENTIFICATION OFFICER PHOTOGRAPHING CRIME SCENE IN 
PRIVATE YARD STUMBLING ON AND SEIZING REAL EVIDENCE 
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REGINA v. CHIPAK- Supreme Court of BC, New Westminster No. X028639, June 1992. 
The accused allegedly attempted to murder a woman in the yard of a private residence at 9:45 
p.m. Police kept the house on this property and the one next door under surveillance as there 
was a possibility that a suspect lived in either home. 
The weather was not at all suitable for the identification officer to examine the scene. 
Furthermore, he did not want to interfere in anyway . with the surveillance. When the officer 
arrived at work the next day around noon, no arrests had been made and the surveillance had 
been cancelled. The officer attended at the crime scene by entering the private yard and took 
photographs. He did not expect to find any physical evidence. However, he discovered a pair 
of glasses on the ground. He never considered obtaining a search warrapt and seized the 
glasses. As it turned out the victim had knocked the glasses off her assailant's face and she 
could testify to that fact. Hence the glasses were weighty evidence particularly as the accused 
admitted to one of the detectives they were his. The crime scene was in the accused's yard. 
Defence counsel argued that not only the real evidence (the glasses) were inadmissible due to 
unreasonable search and seizure, but also the photographs. 
The three decisions17 that were raised in this case established the application of Section 8 of 
the Charter in these circumstances. It was obvious to the Court that the investigating officers 
were unaware of these cases and the affect they had on investigative practices. But it seems that 
the Court did its very best to find distinction between this case and the precedents set in cases 
2 and 3 below. There the officers had searched upon "suspicion" (or so they testified) while in 
this case the officer was in the yard solely to take pictures and then stumbled on the glasses, the 
crucial real evidence. In the other cases the officers possibly had objectively, the prerequisite 
reasonable and probable grounds to search or obtain a warrant. What they apparently lacked 
more than anything was the subjective grounds to search or obtain a warrant. They testified that 
they "thought" there were not enough grounds and believed that the searches did not require 
them to have or that no warrant was obtainable in the circumstances. 
17 Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984) 2 S.C.R. 145 - Also Volume 18, page 12 of this 
publication (Supreme Court of Canada). 
Regina v. Kokesch 61 C.C.C. (3d) 207 - Also volume 39, page 6 of this publication 
(Supreme court of Canada). 
Regina v. Klimchuk - See Volume 40, page 19. (BC Court of Appeal) 
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One must agree, that is riot the case here, with the exception perhaps of the taking of the 
pictures. However, the defence's objections were feeble in regards to the admissibility of the 
pictures. ·The focus of his arguments were in regard to the glasses and this judgment was 
rendered solely in relation to the glasses. 
The Court concluded that a combination of good faith and some distinction of the precedent 
setting cases made it permissible for the glasses to be admitted in evidence. The identification 
officer had not attended to search for anything and he harboured no suspicion of any kind. He 
considered not to need a warrant to take pictures. Had he intended to search the area he 
undoubtedly had from an objective viewpoint grounds to obtain a warrant, held the Court. Said 
the Court: 
"In so far as his knowledge of the law with respect to perimeter 
searches, I reiterate the comments made earlier and add that even 
if he had been familiar with the Supreme Court (of Canada) ruling, 
he could easily have concluded that it had no application to 
photographing a yard" . 
The seriousness of the offence balanced against the Charter breach involved here, would cause 
disrepute to the justice system if the evidence of the glasses were excluded. 
Evidence was admitted 
\ 
POLICE SEARCHING A PICK-UP TRUCK. WITHOUT 
WARRANT - GOODS FOUND SUSPECTED TO HA VE BEEN 
STOLEN - REASONABLENESS OF SEARCH 
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REGINA v. FRIDLEIFSON - Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver CC 911135, January 1992. 
Police maintained surveillance on a house where the accused lived. According to police 
information and that received from the neighbours, there was considerable activity on the 
premises of moving furniture and all kinds of articles. The accused and all associates who had 
been identified by police had records for and were known to be actively involved in property 
offenses. 
Two officers observed the accused backing his truck into his driveway. A large square item was 
in the box covered by a quilt. Police also identified the accused's passenger as one Kahn. They 
erroneously believed the accused by virtue of a probation order, was not to associate with Kahn. 
Police blocked the driveway and as they approached the accused's truck the occupants ran. The 
accused was apprehended and arrested for breach of probation. He was immediately made 
aware of his rights. 
The accused was taken to the back of his truck and one of the officers looked under the guilt. 
The accused explained the TV set belonged to Kahn's mother. The officer then looked in the 
cab of the truck. The doors were standing open and the remote control of the TV was in clear 
view. The TV and quilt had an aggregated value of $1600 and were taken in a B & E that very 
day. However, the officers did not know that at the time. Considering the circumstances and 
reputations they assumed the goods were stolen. Then the officers discovered that the accused 
was not under a probation order not to associate with Kahn. They then cancelled the arrest but 
said they'd believed the TV was stolen. They seized it and said to the accused that if it was 
stolen he'd be charged. Four days laterthe officers discovered the TV had been stolen and they 
arrested the accused. At trial it was discovered that the officers were unaware of the leading 
and latest cases regarding search and seizure. They were under the impression that no warrant 
was required to search the truck. 
Needless to say the defence argued that since the search was warrantless it was ispo facto 
unreasonable18 and the Crown had failed to show that it was not. Of course, the search would 
be reasonable if it was incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrested person and his immediate 
surroundings may then be searched. Defence counsel claimed the first arrest was unlawful and 
the search consequently unreasonable. The stolen goods should be excluded despite the fact it 
18 Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984) - Volume 18, page 12 of this publication 
Regina v. Klimchuk - Volume 40, page 19 of this publication. 
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was real. An additional argument was that the officers had at the time of the search no grounds 
(other than suspicion) that the goods were stolen. Hence the seizure was unlawful as well. 
The defence's threshold was on observations BC's Chief Justice made in the Klimchuk decision. 
Although his judgment was a dissenting one, he said: 
"I am not persuaded that every warrantless search undertaken in 
spontaneous circumstances, particularly where an officer has strong 
suspicions based · upon objective facts known to him, will 
necessarily be unreasonable" . 
The Crown conceded that the officers had no grounds to effect the initial arrest and could not 
conduct the search when they encountered the accused and Kahn with the goods. The Crown 
invited the Court to apply common sense to determine if in the circumstances (what the officers 
knew and the flight) the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
However, the Court rejected to so hold. It· coneluded that a person has expectation of privacy 
in property carried in the back of a pick-up truck "in circumstances similar to those in which 
the stolen property was being carried in this case. Consequently the accused's right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure had been violated. This left as the single issue, if 
admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The major 
factors to be considered to determine this are: 
1. The fairness of the trial; 
2. The seriousness of the Charter violation; and 
3. The consequences of exclusion. 
Of course the balance of the categories is of great importance. 
The Court reviewed what the officers knew and what they witnessed. Despite the fact that the 
officers as a "practice of policy" never obtained search warrants to search a motor vehicle and 
seemed unaware of precedents binding on their investigative practices, they were possibly in a 
position to successfully apply for a search warrant. They knew that the accused's vehicle was 
used for the moving of stolen property. They were aware of the accused's propensity in regard 
to someone else's property. They had been informed of the activities at the accused's house. 
They observed the shape of the TV set under a quilt. When they approached the truck the 
accused and Kahn fled. The search itself had amounted to no more than lifting the corner of 
the quilt and looking in the open cab. It was in terms of being intrusive, trivial by comparison 
with the search of Klimchuk' s car where the incriminating keys to vending machines were found 
in a heater duct. That search had required dismantling of a part of the dashboard. The officers' 
violation of the accused's right under s. 8 of the Charter was a "factor in favour of exclusion" 
but not by any means as significant a factor as it was in Klimchuk. 
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In both cases the evidence was "real". According to the Supreme Court of Canada19 the 
exclusion of real evidence is not required to preserve the fairness of a trial. 
In terms of the consequences of the exclusion of the evidence it does not take a genius to figure 
out that it would result in acquittal. Hence considering the three factors mentioned above, they 
are in terms of circumstances, grounds and severity distinct from those in Klimchuk. This left 
the balance of those factors to be considered. 
Defence counsel strongly submitted that the officers in this case lacked good faith to the same 
degree as their counterparts in Klimchuk. They had all acted without lawful authority either 
deliberately or because of their ignorance of relevant law. If despite this lack, the Courts will 
admit into evidence the fruits of such unlawful practices, the reputation of the administration of 
justice will inevitably be adversely affected. This was the very issue that had tipped the scales 
in favour of exclusion in the Klimchuk case. 
The Court held that the distinctions, as mentioned above, between the two cases in terms of the 
balance between the three factors (fairness of trial; seriousness of infringement of right and 
consequence of exclusion) are sufficiently distinct from Klimchuk that the decision there reached 
is not binding in this case. 
The Court concluded that the TV and quilt were, despite the Charter violation on the part of the 
officers, admissible in evidence. 
Comments: 
Considering the trend of rulings by our highest Courts, it would not be surprising if this · case 
will bite the dust, in regard to the issues discussed here. This despite the fact the Supreme 
Court of Canada said in its trend setting Collins decision on the exclusionary rule [s. 24 (2) 
Charter] that real evidence should not be excluded but in "the rarest cases". Since then there 
had been innumerable "rarest" cases, judging by the real evidence that has been suppressed since 
the Collins decision in 1987. These words "only in the rarest of cases", have been used in many 
recent precedents which, if abused, would amount to absurdities and legal luxuries for our 
criminal element, we can ill afford. "But in the rarest of cases", are superfluous words. What 
was intended to be a small leak turns quickly into a flood. 
Another reason for being pessimistic about this case surviving an appeal is that the actions of 
the officers caused the search to be quite distinct from the seizure. The grounds discussed by 
the trial judge, which were possibly sufficient to get a search warrant, would have authorized 
looking under the quilt and into the cab, but the goods there found were at best suspected to be 
stolen. The grounds for the search were stronger than for the seizure, it seems. The Charter 
19 Regina v. Collins (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) - Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
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by guaranteeing a right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, provides that they 
can be considered separately. It seems possible that one may be reasonable and the other 
unreasonable even in a continuing action in relation to the same goods. 
Although this may be red-neck reasoning, it always astounds me when it is belaboured if, , in 
circumstances like these, admitting the evidence will bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. As it turned out the accused arid his cohort apparently invaded the most private place 
of the owners of the TV set and the quilt. It is not the theft but the intrusion that causes in most 
cases the real trauma of many victims. Here the infringement of the right of the accused pales 
when compared with the invasion of the victim's privacy. Although the former is constitutional 
and the latter criminal, the distinction is established by the classification of the perpetrator. The 
infringement of the accused's right was inflicted by police where they had joined the State in its 
prosecutorial interest and the criminal offence was committed by a private individual. However, 
in terms of victimization the criminal one is weightier by far. 
Needless to say, in our process to determine guilt or innocence the impact on the crime of the 
victim cannot and must not be irrelevant. However, the issues that cause the exclusion of facts 
from being admitted in evidence, are also rarely relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused 
person. 
TIDBITS 
DOCTOR SELLING PRESCRIPTIONS - DOES THIS AMOUNT 
TO TRAFFICKING? 
53 
The accused, a physician, sold prescriptions for narcotics to addicts. He was charged with 
trafficking. As the trial judge found that this practice was not included in the definition of 
trafficking he was acquitted. The Crown appealed. 
The trial judge had held that the verb "to administer" was the one in the definition of trafficking 
the Crown relied on. He found that to prescribe and administer mean different things in regard 
to trafficking. According to the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan20 a narcotic is not 
administered until it enters the recipient's system. 
However the Court of Appeal for Quebec failed to agree with their Saskatchewan counterpart. 
It held that selling prescriptions with profits as a purpose, amount to trafficking. Considering 
that to manufacture, sell, give, send, deliver or distribute are all included in trafficking, the 
Quebec Court of Appeal was not prepared to sacrifice the meaning of trafficking in these 
circumstances, on the alter of formalism. Crown's appeal allowed. Accused convicted. 
Regina v. Rousseau - Court of Appeal for Quebec, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 445. 
******* 
DISHONOURED CHEQUE - PRESUMPTION OF GUILT 
The criminal Code of Canada provides that where a cheque is dishonoured due to insufficient 
funds the goods gained by that cheque were obtained by a false pretence unless the accused can 
show on reasonable grounds that the cheque would be honoured. This provision violates the 
Charter's assurance that we will be presumed innocent unless the Crown, by meeting its burden 
of proof, shows otherwise, held the Court of Appeal for Prince Edward Island. There is no 
rational connection between the prerequisite facts and the presumption of guilt. The trial judge 
in this case had relied on this arbitrary presumption. Hence a new trial was ordered. 
Regina v. Ferguson - Court of Appeal for Prince Edward, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 330. 
20 Regina v. Tan (1984) - 15 C.C.C. (3d) 303. 
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INFORMER IN ARSON CASE SELLING HIS INFORMATION 
TO INSURANCE COMPANY. ABUSE OF THE PROCESS. 
INFORMERS TESTIMONY INADMISSIBLE 
The accused owned an hotel and had a paid arsonist set fire to it so he could collect the 
insurance money. He was charged with arson and attempted fraud. A Mr. P. was the 
intermediary for the accused and he had made all the arrangements with the arsonist. Mr. P. 
then approached the insurance company and offered to provide them with information concerning 
the arson provided he was paid a substantial sum of money. The insurance company promised 
to pay $50,000. to Mr. P. provided the accused was convicted of arson. The police were not 
only fully aware of these negotiations and arrangements, but appeared to have acted as 
intermediaries between Mr. P. and the insurance company. 
The accused claimed that this amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. The Quebec 
Court of Appeal agreed. It held that the abuse was, however, insufficient to stay the 
proceedings but should result in excluding Mr. P's testimony. A new trial was ordered. 
Regina v. Xenos - Quebec Court of Appeal. 70 C.C.C. (3d) 362. 
* * * * * * 
USE OF SURREPTITIOUSLY INSTALLED TRACKING DEVICE IN ACCUSED'S 
CAR AMOUNTS TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
The accused was a suspect in a series of homicides. A search warrant was executed but nothing 
was found. Hours after the expiration and without judicial authorization police installed a beeper 
in the accused's car. This device was used on occasion to locate the accused while he was under 
constant police surveillance. On the day a one million dollar telephone communication tower 
was blown up the police had pin pointed the accused's car near the scene. On that information 
a search warrant was issued for the car and material linked to the tower explosion was found. 
He was charged with mischief. Admissibility became an issue as the use of the beeper was in 
the circumstances an infringement of the accused's right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police use of the device was only 
minimally intrusive and that admitting the evidence obtained as a result would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The evidence was therefore admissible. 
Regina v. Wise - Supreme Court of Canada, February 1992. 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193. 
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SEARCH INCIDENT ON ARREST AND BOOKING PROCEDURES 
The accused breached the curfew imposed on him by means of a probation order. He was 
arrested and searched. No weapons or anything suspicious was found. The officer who booked 
the accused before being placed in cells, paid attention to a cigarette package and found a small 
quantity of cannabis in it. Consequently he was convicted of possession and appealed this to the 
Court of Appeal for Quebec claiming that the search of the cigarette package was unreasonable 
and in violation of his rights under s. 8 of the Charter. This Court of Appeal agreed with the 
accused and reiterated that a search incident to arrest is lawful only to determine that the arrested 
person has nothing on him to harm others or himself, or anything which can constitute evidence 
against the accused. The accused was searched twice and nothing with which he could harm 
anyone was found on him and police had no grounds to believe he was in possession of 
narcotics. In this case, the search of the cigarette package was a fishing expedition and the 
evidence thereby found was not related to the offence for which he was arrested. However, as 
the evidence was real and admitting it would not affect the fairness of the trial, the accused's 
appeal was dismissed. 
Regina v. Garcia - Quebec Court of Appeal - 72 C.C.C. (3d) 240. 

